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Abstract 
This study investigated whether individuals can predict their future prospective memory (PM) 
performance in a lab-based task and in a naturalistic task. Metacognitive awareness was 
assessed by asking participants to give judgments-of-learning (JOLs) on an item-level for the 
prospective (that something has to be done) and retrospective (what to do) PM component. In 
addition, to explore whether giving predictions influences PM performance, we compared a 
control group (without predictions) to a prediction group. Results revealed that giving 
predictions did not change PM performance. Moreover, participants were underconfident in 
their PM performance in the lab-based task, while they were overconfident in the naturalistic 
task. In addition, item-level JOLs indicated that they were inaccurate in predicting what items 
they will recall or not, but only for the prospective component of the PM task. As for the 
retrospective component, they were equally accurate in both task settings. This study suggests 
a dissociation of metacognitive awareness for PM according to both task setting and 
processing component.  
 
Keywords: prospective memory, metacognition, judgment-of-learning  
Words count for the main text: 7’646 
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Introduction 
While sitting at your desk, you think about several items you should buy at the grocery 
store before heading home. On your way back from work, you pass by the store and this 
reminds you that you have things to buy. This example illustrates an important memory 
process that we use everyday: prospective memory (PM; Brandimonte, Einstein & McDaniel, 
1996; Kliegel, McDaniel & Einstein, 2008). PM refers to the ability to remember to realize 
intended actions after a delay either in response to a target event in event-based PM tasks or at 
a specific time or when a specific amount of time has elapsed in time-based PM tasks 
(Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996). In the above-mentioned example, seeing the store on your way 
home acts as a target event that triggers retrieval of the intended action (i.e., grocery 
shopping). A time-based example would be joining a Skype conference call at 3 PM, which 
necessitates time monitoring to carry out the intention at the appropriate moment.  
A particularity of PM tasks is that one has to remember the PM task while being 
engaged in another (ongoing) activity (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). To mimic these demands 
in the laboratory, participants usually perform a computer-based PM task involving an 
ongoing task (e.g., lexical decision task; LDT) in which the PM task is embedded (e.g., 
remembering to press a specific key when a predefined target cue occurs among the LDT 
stimuli). Conceptually, PM has been described as having two process components; the 
prospective component allows one to remember that something has to be done (e.g., stopping 
at the grocery store when passing by), and the retrospective component allows one to 
remember what to do (e.g., recalling the list of items to buy; Einstein & McDaniel, 1996).  
Besides testing PM in the laboratory, a parallel line of research has explored PM 
functioning using naturalistic tasks, which were incorporated in the participants’ everyday life 
(for a review see Phillips, Henry, & Martin, 2008). Participants were, for example, asked to 
remember to send postcards to the experimenter (West, 1988) or to call the laboratory at 
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specific times (Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990). Importantly, for present purposes, 
these two research lines have produced conflicting results: A meta-analytic review by Henry, 
MacLeod, Phillips and Crawford (2004) comparing laboratory versus naturalistic PM 
performance across young and older adults revealed that young adults performed worse in the 
field than in the laboratory and even performed worse than older adults in the field. Previous 
studies suggest that the low performance for naturalistic tasks in the young adults might be 
explained by a high stress level in their everyday life, an ineffective use of reminders and a 
low motivation to perform the given tasks (Ihle, Schnitzspahn, Rendell, Luong, & Kliegel, 
2012). By contrast, higher performance in these tasks by the older adults may stem from 
higher motivation and better knowledge of their personal strengths and strategies (i.e., 
metacognitive awareness, see below; Schnitzspahn, Ihle, Henry, Rendell, & Kliegel, 2011a). 
In the present paper, we argue that metacognitive factors such as metacognitive monitoring 
and control may be key when examining performance differences between laboratory and 
naturalistic PM tasks.  
Why add metacognition to the picture? Metacognition refers to the knowledge about 
our own cognitive abilities. Considering the example of this introduction, may give first 
insights. Consider that, because you know that it is likely that you will forget the items to buy, 
you decide to write down the list on a post-it note and to stick it on your computer screen to 
remind you when you leave work. Monitoring for possible memory failure and thinking of a 
strategy to prevent it are cognitive processes involved in most PM tasks that have surprisingly 
been largely overlooked in PM research (but see Gilbert, 2015). Metacognition in memory 
research is referred to as metamemory (Flavell, 1971) and comprises two sub-processes 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990): first, we evaluate our own memory performance via monitoring at 
encoding (e.g., knowing that we will forget our next dentist appointment) and then second, we 
adjust our behavior in response to the previous evaluation through control (e.g., writing down 
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the date and time of the appointment in our calendar). How is metacognition quantified? In 
retrospective memory, monitoring at encoding is generally assessed with judgments-of-
learning (JOLs; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). Here, they are usually evaluated by asking 
participants to learn related (e.g., table – chair) or unrelated pairs of words (e.g., table – bus) 
and then participants either give a global JOL or item-by-item JOLs. In global JOLs, 
participants predict how many items they will recall or estimate the percentage of cues they 
expect to find across the entire task. In item-by-item JOLs, participants estimate in 
percentage, for each pairs of words separately, the probability of recalling them. Moreover, 
JOLs can be assessed directly after the encoding of each item (i.e., immediate JOLs) or after 
the encoding of all the items (i.e., delayed JOLs). Judgments made after a delay are more 
likely to reflect retention in long term memory and have thus been shown to be more reliable 
(Rhodes, 2016).  
In the retrospective literature, metacognitive performance varies according to the task, 
the methodology used and the memory domain (for a review see Castel, Middlebrooks, & 
McGillivray, 2016). As there is not a clear pattern of age-related preservation or decline, 
metacognitive awareness could differ between the retrospective and prospective domain, as 
well as between laboratory and naturalistic tasks. What do we know about metacognition for 
PM? Initial evidence has been reported that, regarding laboratory tasks, people showed some 
insights in their performance but tended to underestimate themselves (Knight, Harnett & 
Titov, 2005; Meeks, Hicks & Marsch, 2007; Schnitzspahn, Zeintl, Jäger & Kliegel, 2011b). In 
Meeks et al.’ (2007) study, participants provided a global JOL on their performance on a 
laboratory PM task. Results revealed participants to be generally underconfident in their PM 
performance. However, the predictions correlated positively with PM performance, but only 
in one out of two cue conditions. Thus, individuals seem are better with predicting 
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performance for certain intentions than others (see Schnitzspahn et al., 2011b, for similar 
findings). 
With respect to naturalistic tasks, there is only one early study that has explored this 
question; interestingly revealing the opposite pattern: here, young adults overestimated their 
PM performance. In a sample of young and older adults, Devolder et al. (1990) asked their 
participants to give global predictions prior to multiple retrospective memory tasks in the 
laboratory and to one PM task outside of the laboratory. The latter was an appointment 
keeping task in which the participants had to call the experimenter at specified times over a 4-
week period. Young participants not only overestimated their future PM performance, they 
also had lower performance and were less accurate in their predictions than the older adults.  
Taken together, there is initial evidence that (a) metacognitive awareness can be 
assessed for PM similarly to retrospective memory and – more importantly – that (b) 
performance predictions may differ between the laboratory and naturalistic tasks. This task 
setting difference in metacognitive evaluation of PM could in turn critically influence how 
participants encode and plan their future intentions across both settings and finally how they 
perform. Thus, the first aim of our study was to compare individuals’ PM performance in two 
traditional PM task types, that have been widely used in the laboratory and in naturalistic 
settings and to examine whether assessing performance predictions influenced actual 
performance in both settings.  
As an additional aspect, all participants performed the PM tasks in the two settings, 
but only half of them gave performance predictions. This design was motivated by the 
rationale that making predictions could increase the perceived importance of the task (Hering, 
Phillips, & Kliegel, 2013) or help to anticipate similarly to an implementation intentions 
strategy (Schnitzspahn & Kliegel, 2009). This could result in better PM performance and/or 
affect costs in the ongoing task, if participants monitor more for the PM cues. Indeed, one has 
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to consider a potential complication when assessing item-level JOLs for laboratory and 
naturalistic PM tasks that may be particularly relevant for PM research. In detail, in PM tasks, 
performance predictions could alter PM performance itself as they may enhance PM 
performance by repeatedly highlighting the intention after initial encoding for future retrieval 
(see, e.g., Meier, Wartburg, Matter, Rothen, & Reber, 2011 who showed that performance 
predictions may make the intention more accessible or Rummel, Kuhlmann & Touron, 2013, 
who found that PM performance increased in a prediction group compared to a control group 
without performance predictions).  
The second aim was to investigate metacognitive processes in PM in a fine-grained 
manner by asking participants to predict their performance with predictions on an item level 
separately for a traditional laboratory and naturalistic tasks. While global JOLs allow to 
estimate a general score of over- or underconfidence, JOLs that are provided at an item-level 
allow distinction and interpretation of two aspects in performance predictions, (a) whether 
individuals are under- or overconfident about their performance by comparing the average 
JOLs with the percentage of items actually recalled (i.e., calibration of predictions to the 
performance), and (b) whether individuals can correctly discriminate between recalled and 
non-recalled items (i.e. resolution of judgments) calculated by the Goodman-Kruskal 
correlation (referred hereafter as gamma correlation; Nelson, 1984). To extend the level of 
analysis in that matter as exploratory research questions, we examined predictions (a) on the 
item level and (b) we disentangled performance and JOLs for the two main process 
subcomponents in a PM task; i.e., the prospective and retrospective component. So far, only 
one study has investigated whether item-by-item JOLs in a PM task show the same effects 
that are found in retrospective memory (Schnitzspahn et al., 2011b). 
The authors asked 60 undergraduate students to read a story on a computer as an 
ongoing task. Prior to reading the story, the participants had to learn ten PM cues which were 
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specific words that were paired with an action (e.g., cafeteria – greet the cook). The cues were 
evenly distributed in the text and participants were instructed to click on the PM cue 
(prospective component) and to type the associated action (retrospective component).  They 
were asked to predict their future performance by giving item-by-item JOLs for each word-
action pair; separately for the two components, first as the probability of becoming aware that 
something has to be done upon encountering the PM cue, and second as the probability of 
retrospectively recalling the content of the associated action. The authors found a positive 
relationship between predictions and performance for both PM components, with higher 
correlations for the retrospective component than the prospective one. This result suggests 
that on an item-level young adults have some awareness in their performance for lab-based 
future intentions, but that they tended to underestimate their performance. More specifically, 
participants were underconfident for the prospective component, but overconfident for the 
retrospective component.  
To follow-up on this study, our goal was to further zoom-in on the specific processes 
underlying the relation between metacognition and PM performance by disentangling 
predictions for the two main sub-processes of PM: the prospective and retrospective 
components. This may allow to decompose the source of possible metacognitive over / 
underestimations and to further specify whether over- versus underestimation may stem from 
rather attentional or memory-related process characteristics of PM tasks. Specifically, in an 
event-based laboratory task requiring to remember to press a specific key whenever 
encountering a specific PM cue performance can fail in two aspects: either one can miss the 
PM cue (prospective component error) or one can forget what action to perform in response to 
the prospective cue (retrospective component error). The first aspect has been related to rather 
attentional and executive functioning (Kliegel, Mackinlay, & Jäger, 2008), while the second 
aspect has been associated to episodic memory (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Smith & Bayen, 
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2006). To be able to disentangle both components in the present study, performance 
predictions were made for both components separately, in the laboratory and also for the 
naturalistic task.  
To sum up, we investigated PM performance and performance predictions with several 
research questions. First, regarding PM performance, we examined possible better PM 
performance for the prediction group compared to the control group. In addition, by 
comparing PM performance in a traditional laboratory compared to a traditional field task, we 
expected to replicate better performance in the laboratory than in the field. Second regarding 
predictions, we examined calibration of the predictions to the performance on the prospective 
component and tested whether we could corroborate the general underconfidence for a PM 
task in the laboratory and overconfidence for a PM task in the field. As additional exploratory 
research questions, we examined resolution of the judgments in both settings for the first time. 
Moreover, we examined a possible differentiation in both performance and predictions for the 
prospective and retrospective components of the tasks expecting better performance, as well 
as better calibration and higher accuracy for the retrospective component compared to the 
prospective one.  
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
In total, 87 young adults (M = 22.04 years, SD = 2.16; age range = 19-30 years; 11 
male) took part in the study.1 Participants were students at the University of Geneva and 
participated in exchange for course credits. All participants were native French speakers. The 
Ethics Committee of the University of Geneva approved the study and all participants gave 
informed consent prior to taking part in the experiment. 
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The study followed a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial design to investigate the effects of 
group, setting and component on PM performance and predictions. The between-subjects 
variable was group (control, prediction) and the within-subjects variables were setting (lab-
based, naturalistic) and components (prospective, retrospective).  
 
Materials 
Laboratory-based task 
Ongoing task. The lab-based PM task followed the traditional paradigm from Einstein 
and McDaniel (1990) in which the PM task is embedded in an ongoing task. The latter was a 
lexical-decision task (LDT). The verbal material came from a pool of 866 French words rated 
by valence and subjective frequency (Bonin et al., 2003). From this set, we selected 210 
words of neutral valence, medium frequency and similar length between one and two 
syllables. Non-words were created by switching the consonants of each word stimulus, 
resulting in an equal number of valid French words (e.g., Tonneau) and pronounceable non-
words (e.g., Noteau). Each LDT trial (font in 36 point, white color) was presented in the 
center of a black screen, followed by a fixation cross of variable duration (250-750 ms). The 
stimuli (i.e., either a word or non-word) stayed on the screen until the participant responded. 
Participants were instructed to press the “yes” key with the right index finger (j-key) if the 
stimulus presented was a valid French word and the “no” key with the left index finger (f-key) 
if the stimulus was not a valid French word. They performed a training session with 10 trials 
before the test phase. After each trial, a feedback was given as “correct” or “incorrect” and at 
the end of the training, participants were informed of their score in percentage. Under 80% 
correct, participants had to redo the training. 
PM task. For the PM task, participants were further instructed that we were interested 
in their ability to perform a second task alongside the LDT. They were asked to remember to 
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press the “white key” (i.e., a key marked in white on the keyboard) instead of the “yes/no” 
key when they identified one of the pre-specified PM cues. The PM task consisted of 15 cue-
word pairs that the participant had to memorize prior to the test phase (i.e., the LDT). For 
encoding, each PM cue was presented as the first word of a pair and the participants were 
instructed to learn the cue words and the related words as word pairs (e.g., Collier - Ruche). 
The cue-word pairs consisted of two non-related words each controlled for having 2 syllables 
and neutral valence taken from the words set mentioned above (Bonin et al., 2003). During 
the encoding, the stimuli were presented twice and for 4 seconds each. During the LDT, 
participants were instructed to press the white key instead of their ongoing task response 
when they detected one of the PM cues (i.e., the first word of the learned cue-word pairs); 
when they did so, a text box appeared, and they were asked to type in the related word (i.e., 
the second word of the word pair; note that they could press the white key on any word 
stimulus of the task). This approach enabled us to disentangle the two different PM 
components within PM performance: (a) performance on the prospective component, 
measured by the accuracy of remembering to press the PM key when encountering the PM 
cues, and (b) performance on the retrospective component, examined by the accuracy of 
retrieving the related word to the cue (see Schnitzspahn et al., 2011b; Cauvin et al., 2017, for 
a similar procedure). Additionally, the participants were instructed to press the PM key 
whenever they detected a PM cue, even if they already gave the ongoing task response or 
even if they forgot the word related to the cue. The participants were specifically told that 
both tasks were important and that they should answer as fast and as accurately as possible. 
To analyze possible additional costs of the PM task, two versions of the task - an ongoing task 
only (70 stimuli) and the ongoing task with a PM task embedded (150 stimuli) - were given to 
the participants in a counterbalanced manner. Participants were explicitly informed before the 
beginning of the block that they would perform the ongoing task only.  
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JOLs. For the laboratory task (and the naturalistic task, see below), after memorization 
of all the cue-word pairs participants were asked to give two types of JOLs for each item (see 
Figure 1). Participants estimated the probability of successful future PM performance on a 
scale from 0% to 100% (0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, or 100%; e.g. Nelson & Dunlosky, 
1991). First, a pJOL for the prospective component as the probability of becoming aware that 
something had to be done upon encountering a PM cue and second, an rJOL for the 
retrospective component as the probability of retrospectively recalling the associated word of 
the specific PM cue. Importantly, in each case the question did not include the specific PM 
cue, but rather used a generic term. For example, in the lab-based task for the “Train – Papier” 
cue-word pair, the pJOL was “How probable is it that you will press the white key upon 
encountering a vehicle?”, and the rJOL was “How probable is it that you will remember the 
word associated with a vehicle?”. Each cue belonged to a different superordinate category and 
by using this method we avoided explicitly repeating the specific PM cues after the encoding 
phase. 
 
Naturalistic task 
PM task. The naturalistic task was a traditional paradigm that has been used repeatedly 
to assess PM in everyday life (especially in the context of the age PM paradox; see e.g., 
Aberle, Rendell, Rose, McDaniel, & Kliegel, 2010; Schnitzspahn et al. 2011a). Participants 
were asked to remember to send text messages to the experimenter at specific target times. 
The times were set in the laboratory together with the participants, one in the morning and 
one in the afternoon over four days, starting the afternoon after the initial laboratory session 
(for details on the procedure, see below). The time frame intervals were: in the morning 
between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. and in the afternoon between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. Participants could 
choose any time that suit them best, the second constraint was that each hour and minutes 
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should be different. For each PM target time, a pre-defined word was associated as the 
content of the text message (the same words for all participants). Participants had 5 minutes to 
memorize a total of 7 time-word pairs and were informed only after encoding that they could 
keep the schedule with the times, but not the words, as a reminder. Messages sent six minutes 
before or after the prescribed time were classified as correct PM answers (for a similar 
procedure, see Schnitzspahn et al. (2011a). 
JOLs. For the naturalistic task, the pJOLs were adapted for the time-based task so that 
the question referred to the general time in which the task had to be performed, for example 
“How probable is it that you will send a text message on Monday afternoon?”; while the rJOL 
referred to the word associated with the specified time, for example “How probable is it that 
you will send the correct word on Monday afternoon?”.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment was divided into two sessions a week apart. To control for any task 
order effect, half of the participants started with the lab-based task, while the other half started 
with the naturalistic task. For the same reason, to control for the PM load effect on the 
computer task, half of the participants started with the ongoing task only, while the other half 
started with the PM task. The first session started with the consent forms and a 
sociodemographic questionnaire. Participants who started with the naturalistic task first, came 
in the laboratory to give their consent and to receive the instructions for the task. They came 
back one week later for the follow-up on the naturalistic task and the lab-based task. The 
other participants started with the computer task, received the instructions for the naturalistic 
task and came back for a follow-up on the experiment one week later. An individual session 
with the computer task lasted approximately 1 hour, while an instruction only session or a 
follow-up session only lasted 30 minutes; the two sessions lasting in total one hour and a half.  
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The procedure described in more detail below, was the one for a participant who 
started with the lab-based task in the prediction condition; the only difference with the control 
condition was the extra JOL assessment. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
prediction condition, so that half of them answered JOLs while the other half did not. In the 
first session, after informed consent was obtained, participants first completed a socio-
demographic questionnaire and then were instructed with the computerized LDT. After 
succeeding the training trials half of them started either with the ongoing task only, or were 
given further instructions about the PM task. To ensure that the participants understood the 
instructions correctly, they were asked to orally explain the task back to the experimenter. All 
participants were able to correctly explain the task right away and therefore could proceed to 
the encoding phase. Following the encoding of all the PM cues, participants gave their JOLs 
for each cue and the related word. Then, there was a 3-minute delay, in which participants 
performed the Digit-Symbol test before the PM test phase began. At the end of the computer 
task, as a recognition test, participants were asked to decide among 60 stimuli if yes or no the 
word presented had been part of the words they had to learn for the test phase (15 cues and 15 
related words). Then, they received the instructions for the naturalistic task and scheduled the 
times to send the text messages as well as the next session with the experimenter. After the 
naturalistic PM encoding phase, they again gave the JOLs, and only after this were they 
informed that they could keep the calendar as a reminder. Participants finished the session by 
completing the vocabulary test, as well as a questionnaire on computer and phone usage. One 
week later, participants came back for a follow-up on the naturalistic task, consisting in 
general questions about the task, such as if they used the sheet as a reminder and what they 
were doing when they had to send the text messages. The follow-up also comprised a 
recognition test for the 7 related words, they had to decide if yes or no the word presented was 
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part of the words they had to send among 30 stimuli. Participants were then debriefed and 
thanked for their participation.  
 
Results 
 
Data analyses 
In the following result section, two main types of analyses will be done. One type refers to 
confirmatory analyses, which will test the explicit hypotheses that was derived from the 
literature (see below). The second type refers to exploratory analyses, which will explore a 
number of new research questions where we could not derive clear hypotheses from the 
existing literature. Following our hypotheses and as confirmatory analyses, we tested the 
effects of JOLs on performance. First, on ongoing task performance with 2 x 2 (group x PM 
load) repeated measures ANOVA and second, on PM performance with separate independent 
t-tests. Then, in the prediction group only, we analyzed mean PM performance, mean JOLs 
and gamma correlations in 2 x 2 (setting x component) repeated measures ANOVAs. As we 
tested performance and calibration for the prospective and retrospective in the same analyses 
(as a within-subject factor), it is to be noted that analyses regarding the prospective 
component were confirmatory, while analyses regarding the retrospective component were 
exploratory. All of the analyses on JOLs resolution were exploratory.  
 
Testing the effects of JOLs on performance 
Ongoing task performance 
To test whether performance predictions and an added PM task influenced ongoing 
task performance, we analyzed ongoing task accuracy and reaction time in 2 group (control 
vs. prediction) x 2 PM load (without PM vs. with PM) ANOVAs.  
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Participants who gave performance predictions had the same ongoing task accuracy 
(M = .91, SE = .006) as the participants who did not give predictions (M = .91, SE = .006), 
F(1,86) < 1. As expected, performance was worse with the PM load (M = .87, SE = .005) than 
without (M = .95, SE = .004), F(1, 86) = 250.851 , p < .001, ηp² = .742. The interaction 
between group and PM load was not significant, F(1,86) < 1. 
As for the reaction times, participants who gave performance predictions were faster 
(M = 718ms, SE = 18ms) than the ones who did not (M = 796ms, SE = 19ms), F(1, 86) = 
8.576 , p < .005, ηp² = .091. As expected, participants were slower with the added PM load (M 
= 63s1, SE = 10ms) than without (M = 883ms, SE = 18ms), F(1, 86) = 398.779, p < .001, ηp² 
= .823. The interaction was again not significant, F(1,86) = 2.412, p = .124.  
 
Prospective memory performance 
In the laboratory, the retrospective component (recalling the associated word) is tied to 
the prospective response in the sense that when participants missed a PM cue, they could not 
recall the associated word. To account for this, we computed retrospective accuracy based on 
the PM hits for each participant. This was not necessary for the naturalistic task, since 
participants could miss the time for the prospective response, but still send the associated 
word later. On average, this happened 3.5 times (SD = 1.9). We also removed the cues that 
were missed in the recognition test at the end of the experiment for each participant, 
considered as retrospective failure (mean performance in the lab-based task (M = 0.87, SE = 
0.06)); and naturalistic task (M = 0.98, SE = 0.02). To allow comparisons between prospective 
and retrospective performance in both settings and later comparisons with the mean JOLs, we 
transformed the mean scores of performance as percentages.   
To test whether giving predictions (answering JOLs) influenced PM performance, we 
conducted separate t tests on PM scores for the prospective and retrospective components in 
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both laboratory and naturalistic settings (see Table 1 for inferential statistics and descriptives).  
The differences between the control and the prediction groups did not reach statistical 
significance (all ps > .488). Consequently, the following analyses are conducted in the 
prediction group only to allow direct comparison between performance and predictions. All 
data are percentage indicated to facilitate subsequent comparison.  
 
Laboratory versus naturalistic PM performance in the prediction condition 
To examine PM performance of the prediction group in the two settings, we analyzed 
PM scores in a 2 setting (laboratory vs. naturalistic) x 2 component (prospective vs. 
retrospective) repeated-measures ANOVA.  
Participants reached similar PM performance levels in the laboratory (M = 64.13, SE = 
3.63) and in the field (M = 57.92, SE = 2.77), F(1, 45) = 2.031, p = .161, ηp² = .043. 
Performance on the retrospective component (M = 72.12, SE = 2.93) was better than on the 
prospective one (M = 49.93, SE = 2.45), F(1, 45) = 75.393, p < .001, ηp² = .626. The 
interaction between setting and component was significant, F(1, 45) = 33.317, p < .001, ηp² = 
.425. Follow-up tests revealed that participants had better performance on the prospective 
component in the laboratory compared to the field, F(1, 45) = 30.020, p < .001, ηp² = .400. 
But they had better performance on the retrospective component in the field than in the 
laboratory, F(1, 45) = 7.554, p =  .009, ηp² = .144. Moreover, performance on the prospective 
component and on the retrospective one did not differ in the laboratory, F (1, 45) = .116, p = 
.735, ηp² = .003, while performance on the retrospective component was better than the 
prospective one in the field, F(1, 45) = 123.141, p < .001, ηp² = .732. Note that a link between 
the prospective and retrospective component in the laboratory may be due to our paradigm, 
which was supported by a marginally significant correlation (r = .282, p = .058, N = 46). 
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However, in the field, where both components could be assessed independently, there also 
was a marginally positive relation between the two components (r = .277, p = .063, N = 46).  
 
Exploring the predictions 
JOL calibration 
The first analytical step in exploring performance predictions consists in estimating, in 
the prediction group, participants’ calibration by looking into JOLs magnitude (mean 
predictions) in order to compare it with mean performance. When participants missed a PM 
cue they could not recall the associated word, thus we left out the predictions made on the 
retrospective component (rJOLs) linked to the PM misses. However we considered all the 
predictions for the prospective components (pJOLs) in both settings and the rJOLs in the 
naturalistic tasks. To test if predictions follow the same pattern as PM performance, we 
analyzed participants’ predictions in a 2 setting (laboratory vs. naturalistic) x 2 component 
(prospective vs. retrospective) ANOVA. 
Participants predicted lower performance in the lab-task (M = 48.22, SE = 2.86) 
compared to the naturalistic task (M = 61.27, SE = 2.46), F(1, 45) = 15.357, p < .001, ηp² = 
.254. Hence showing underconfidence for the lab-task and overconfidence for the naturalistic 
task, considering that mean performance was comparable across settings. Participants gave 
similar predictions for the prospective (M = 54.15, SE = 1.70) and the retrospective 
components (M = 55.34, SE = 2.89), F(1, 45) = .275, p = .603, ηp² = .006. However the 
interaction between setting and component was significant, F(1, 45) = 33.570, p < .001, ηp² = 
.427. Follow-up tests revealed that in the lab-task, participants gave higher predictions for the 
prospective component compared to the retrospective one, F(1, 45) = 12.457, p = .001, ηp² = 
.217, while in the naturalistic task participants gave higher predictions for the retrospective 
component compared to the prospective one, F(1, 45) = 11.454, p = .001, ηp² = .203. They 
JUDGMENTS-OF-LEARNING IN LAB VS. NATURALISTIC PM TASKS 19 
also predicted better performance for the retrospective component in the field compared to the 
laboratory, F(1, 45) = 45.195, p < .001, ηp² = .501; following the same pattern as the 
performance. However, they predicted the same prospective performance in the laboratory 
and in the field, F(1, 45) = .748, p = .392, ηp² = .016.  
For a global indication of over- or underconfidence, we compared the mean JOLs with 
the actual mean performance (all ps < .001), by looking at the difference between the two (see 
Figure 2 for difference scores, all scores reliably greater than zero, ps < .001). The pJOLs and 
rJOLs in both settings were positively related, with a high correlation in the laboratory (r = 
.719, p < .001, N = 46) and a medium one in the field (r =.428, p < .001, N = 46).  
 
JOL resolution 
The second analytical step in exploring performance predictions consists in estimating 
participants’ resolution by looking into Gamma correlations between each participant’s JOL 
(Nelson, 1984). Gamma is a continuous variable that ranges from -1 to +1. A large positive 
value means a high degree of accuracy; a value of zero means chance-level accuracy, and a 
negative value means less than chance-level accuracy. To examine if relative accuracy 
differed between task settings, we analyzed participants’ Gamma correlation in a 2 setting 
(laboratory vs. naturalistic) x 2 component (prospective vs. retrospective) ANOVA. 
Participants showed the same resolution in predicting their performance in the 
laboratory (M = .230, SE = .053) and outside of the laboratory (M = .209, SE = .042), F(1, 45) 
= .101, p = .753, ηp² = .002. Gamma correlations did not differ between the prospective (M = 
.154, SE = .056) and the retrospective component (M = .285, SE = .042) of the JOLs, F(1, 45) 
= 3.252, p = .078, ηp² = .067. However the interaction between setting and component was 
again significant, F(1, 45) = 11.677, p < .01, ηp² = .206. Follow-up tests showed that in the 
lab-task Gamma correlations did not differ between the prospective (M = .288, SE = .067) and 
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the retrospective component (M = .173, SE = .074), F(1, 45) = 1.558, p = .218, ηp² = .033, 
while in the naturalistic task Gamma correlations were higher for the retrospective (M = .398, 
SE = .055) than the prospective component (M = .020, SE = .082), F(1, 45) = 11.536, p = 
.001, ηp² = .204. Gamma correlation for the prospective component was better in the 
laboratory than in the field, F(1, 45) = 7.385, p = .009, ηp² = .141. By contrast, gamma 
correlation for the retrospective component was better in the field than in the laboratory, F(1, 
45) = 5.142, p = .028, ηp² = .103. 
Overall mean Gamma correlations were reliably greater than zero for both components 
in the lab task (Gamma pJOL: t(45) = 4.333, p < .001; Gamma rJOL: t(45) = 2.332, p =.024)  
and the retrospective component in the naturalistic task, t(45) = 7.27, p < .001); indicating 
above-chance resolution of JOLs. However, mean Gamma correlation for the prospective 
component in the naturalistic task did not differ from zero, t(45) = .247, p = .806, indicating a 
chance-level accuracy. 
 
Discussion 
The first aim of this study was to examine whether people can accurately predict their 
future PM performance in laboratory and/or naturalistic contexts and whether making 
predictions would influence performance by comparing a control group and a prediction 
group. As a second aim we examined these predictions on a fine grained level using item 
level predictions and explored whether the predictions may differ for PM task components, 
disentangling a prospective and a retrospective components of each PM task.  
The influence of performance predictions 
Previous studies have found that global JOLs may influence PM performance 
positively (Meier et al. 2011; Rummel et al., 2013). Our results did not replicate this effect 
and showed that PM performance in the prediction group was comparable to the control 
JUDGMENTS-OF-LEARNING IN LAB VS. NATURALISTIC PM TASKS 21 
group. This is likely related to the way our JOLs were introduced. Although giving 
predictions for each item could have enhanced activation of the PM task in mind, the use of 
superordinate categories instead of repeating exactly the specific cue words may have 
prevented an additional encoding compared to the control group. Moreover, the delay interval 
between the JOLs and the PM task with a cognitively demanding task prevented the PM task 
from being too present in mind (Schnitzspahn et al., 2011b). However, it has to be noted that 
although giving predictions did not change overt PM performance, it seemed to have 
somewhat influenced ongoing task performance for the PM cues: participants in the 
prediction group were faster in the LDT than the control group, while showing the same 
accuracy. This may be a sign of more automatic processing. Thus, future research is needed to 
investigate the possible influence of JOLs on monitoring of cues. However, compared to 
former studies with global JOLs, the present paradigm with item-by-item JOLs using generic 
categories did not directly influence the PM results. 
Predictions of future PM performance: Exploring underlying process components 
The pattern of performance in the two different contexts was reflected in the 
predictions. In fact, the participants gave higher pJOLs than rJOLs in the laboratory and 
higher rJOLs than pJOLs in the field, thus showing some metacognitive awareness of their 
future PM performance. With regard to the prospective component of PM performance we 
replicated what is usually found in young adults: PM performance was better in the lab-based 
task compared to the naturalistic task (Henry et al., 2004). Interestingly, participants 
performed better on the prospective component than the retrospective one in the laboratory, 
by contrast they performed better on the retrospective component than the prospective one in 
the field. More specifically, in the lab-based task participants were better at recognizing PM 
cues than at retrieving the associated word. In the naturalistic task, participants performed 
relatively poorly in sending the text messages on time, but were better at retrieving the 
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associated word; even remembering the content after a three-day period. This is a typical PM 
failure: we often realize too late that we had something to do, but we do not forget what it 
was. However, this result needs to be interpreted with caution as not only the task setting was 
different but also the task type (event-based vs. time-based). Future research needs to use the 
same type of tasks to observe if there is a possible double dissociation with respect to setting 
and PM components.  
Regarding the predictions, participants seemed not to be aware that the two tasks differ 
in nature, but they seem to differenciate the two components of a PM task. However, the 
magnitude of the JOLs was not perfectly in line with the actual performance. In the 
laboratory, participants predicted poorer performance on the prospective component, while in 
the field they gave the same magnitude of predictions as in the laboratory, but performed less 
well on the PM task. In previous studies, individuals tended to underestimate their 
performance in an unfamiliar lab-task (Meeks et al., 2007, Schnitzspahn et al., 2011b), which 
was also found here. Interestingly, in contrast to this, the same participants were 
overconfident in the naturalistic setting which dovetails with Devolder et al.’s (1990) 
findings. In terms of performance, this overconfidence might have led to a failure in 
generating appropriate strategies to implement the delayed intention; suggesting a failure in 
the control process of metacognition. Indeed, the obtained lack of a benefit of making 
predictions on performance seems to be in line with this interpretation. Moreover, in the 
laboratory predictions for the retrospective component were similar to the prospective one 
suggesting that participants may have used the same criterion for retrospective and 
prospective processes, not realizing that remembering the initiation of intentions may be 
different from traditional declarative memory retrieval. In contrast, in the field, there was a 
considerable difference between the predictions on the prospective and retrospective 
components. This suggests that on this task, participants may have been aware of the 
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difference between remembering to perform the task in time and retrieving the word from 
long term memory. Again, this explanation needs to be further explored to disentangle 
whether the difference in predictions are due to the setting or the nature of the PM task. 
In the light of our exploratory research questions, important new insights are further 
provided by considering the accuracy of the item-by-item predictions. This measure shows if 
participants correctly discriminated between items they will remember or not. Here, we 
observed that participants were as accurate for the prospective as for the retrospective 
component in the laboratory, but they were only accurate on the retrospective component in 
the field and were at chance-level for the prospective component. They were not only 
overconfident in their predictions, they were also inaccurate in predicting whether they will 
send the text message or not in that their predictions did not discriminate between actions that 
were ultimately carried out on time or forgotten. These findings dovetail with Schnitzspahn et 
al. (2011b) who had found that the accuracy of the retrospective component was more similar 
to what is usually obtained in laboratory studies of retrospective metamemory using standard 
word pair tasks. The present study further confirms that it seems more difficult to predict 
whether we will recognize the target or send a text message than to predict retrospective 
retrieval. To forget a future intention could have severe consequences in everyday life, but it 
seems that people have difficulties in predicting if their PM will fail or not, which could, in 
turn, prevent them from generating useful strategies. 
One possibility is that monitoring of what we have learned, for example a word list, a 
set of facts, or a phone number, is a form of metacognition that is better trained and more 
habitually used than the monitoring of future intentions.  For instance, repeated study-test 
procedures in education mean that we become accustomed to what are reasonable levels of 
performance for verbal materials. Moreover, the JOL procedure for learned materials (in our 
task operationalised as an rJOL) actually includes the possibility of self-test in a task-relevant 
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manner, which is not possible in the pJOL condition. Numerous studies have identified a 
delayed JOL effect in retrospective memory (e.g. Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991), which suggests 
that people use a retrieval attempt to inform their JOL prediction. In our task, participants had 
five minutes to encode the items and then made their predictions. It is possible, that - to make 
these rJOLs - participants assessed whether they can recall the target word, and this acted as a 
‘practice’: here, the JOL procedure included a task relevant retrieval of the to-be-remembered 
item. In contrast, in making a pJOL, any retrieval attempt is not going to be diagnostic for 
future PM performance: one can imagine one’s performance based on a number of cues and 
factors, but one does not have the same possibility to self-test. The fact that we found rJOLs 
and pJOLs to be correlated seems to suggest that participants misapplied their traditional 
memory heuristics and that cues they used for rJOLs were also used in making their pJOLs. 
Another post hoc explanation could be that individuals do not consider or appreciate 
all the factors involved in PM tasks. This is particularly the case in the naturalistic task, where 
the task is unconstrained and distractions and impediments to performance are potentially 
infinite. First, for instance, the duration and thus the delay of the naturalistic task was longer 
than in the laboratory, and lasted over three days. Second, people may have given optimistic 
predictions based on their optimal performance, without considering that in everyday life 
unexpected events can occur that will prevent them to execute the intention as planned.  
Another possible explanation for discrepant metacognitive predictions compared with 
actual performance is the relative difficulty of the two tasks. To stay as close as possible to 
the traditionally used PM paradigms, we used two well established and often applied PM 
tasks but are aware that one could argue that they are not comparable in nature (e.g., event 
versus time), even if they are usually directly compared in the context of research on the age 
PM paradox (Henry et al., 2004; Schnitzspahn et al., 2011b). Thus, it would be compelling in 
future studies to use laboratory and naturalistic tasks that are more similar and to compare 
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them regarding performance as well as predictions (e.g., two time-based tasks). A challenge 
in creating a truly naturalistic task is to maintain experimental control. However, it would be 
interesting to test if the effects revealed in the present study hold in real-life tasks. This might 
be possible with a diary keeping approach (see Schnitzspahn et al., 2016).  
It should be noted that the sample is predominantly female and university students in 
Psychology. Thus, the results regarding performance or metacognition may not be 
generalizable to other institutions or demographics. Future studies should include larger 
ranges in the level of education of participants, as well as extend the sample to older 
participants to look into age-related changes in performance and metacognitive awareness.  
Finally, in the metamemory literature, there has been very little examination of 
metacognitive processes in task delays applied in the present study rendering our study unique  
in that sense (but see Weaver et al. 2008, for differences in predictions on laboratory and real 
world materials). Thus, it appears important to underline that our results suggest that 
moderately accurate JOLs are possible for the retrospective component of a task even over a 
four-day period. In other words, predictions made after studying items for five minutes can be 
accurate days later (if anything, the rJOLs were even more accurate for the naturalistic task 
than for the laboratory task). 
Our study offers important first insights in key questions such as how accurately 
individuals predict their future intentions in different contexts and if these predictions 
influence performance, it also leaves several open issues. We acknowledge that our 
explanations are partly preliminary and have to remain somewhat speculative in some 
questions. Future studies looking into PM and metacognition should also consider the control 
process of metamemory. Indeed, over- or underconfidence is likely to affect what we will do 
to aid future memory retrieval.  In terms of future directions, we suggest that studies on 
metacognition in PM could bring answers to unresolved questions in the field of PM. 
JUDGMENTS-OF-LEARNING IN LAB VS. NATURALISTIC PM TASKS 26 
Overestimation – in our case by young adults - in naturalistic tasks could explain why they 
perform less well than older adults in this context. To test this, future studies should address 
predictions in young and older adults in both contexts. This could give some insights in the 
“age-PM paradox” (Henry et al., 2004; Rendell & Thomson, 1999; Schnitzspahn et al., 
2011a).  
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Footnote 
 1 Sample size had initially been calculated in the context of a study design comparing 
young and older adults. Here, an a priori power analysis indicated that a total sample size of N 
= 176 (88 young and 88 older adults) is large enough to detect a medium effect of ɳ2 = .06 (f 
= .25) with an alpha probability of .05 and a power of .90 (all power analyses were conducted 
using G*Power 3.10). Due to administrative reasons, the older cohort could not be tested with 
the present protocol and the present paper therefore focuses on the younger cohort only. Note, 
that we tested 90 younger participants altogether but had to exclude three participants because 
their native language was not French.  
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Figure 1. Encoding phase followed by the JOL phase with an example of a JOL for the word 
pair “Ring - Bus using the supra-ordinate category of the PM cue (i.e. jewellery).  
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Figure 2. Differences between the predictions and the performance scores for the two 
components of the tasks in the two settings. Differences were conducted by subtracting the 
mean performance in % from the mean JOL in %. Thus, negative values represent 
participants’ underconfidence and positive values their overconfidence. 
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Table 1. Descriptive (means and standard errors) and inferential statistics comparing the 
control and prediction groups on PM performance in the laboratory and naturalistic setting 
for the prospective and retrospective components 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Inferential statistics 
  
Prediction group 
M (SE) 
  
Control group 
M (SE)   
t(86) p 
Laboratory setting 
      Prospective 
component 
62.50 (27.93) 
 
64.5 (23.71) 
 
-0.365 0.716 
Retrospective 
component 
60.56 (37.02) 
 
55.37 (33.70) 
 
0.696 0.488 
Naturalistic setting       
Prospective 
component 
33.93 (24.59) 
 
31.89 (29.71) 
 
0.357 0.722 
Retrospective 
component 
78.27 (25.86)   81.39 (28.15)   -0.551 0.583 
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Table 2. Participants' mean scores and standard deviations for prospective and 
retrospective components of PM performance and predictions in the laboratory and 
naturalistic setting 
 
Laboratory 
 
Naturalistic    
  Prospective   Retrospective   Prospective   Retrospective   
Predictions 
        
M (SD) 52.41 (2.79) 
 
44.03 (3.37) 
 
55.90 (2.28) 
 
66.65 (3.31) 
 
         
Performance 
        
    M (SD) 65.07 (3.77) 
 
63.19 (5.24) 
 
34.78 (3.63) 
 
81.06 (3.30) 
 
         
Note. All data are proportion correct.            
 
